Human Experiments and National Security: The Need to Clarify Policy by Moreno, Jonathan
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Center for Bioethics Papers Center for Bioethics
April 2003
Human Experiments and National Security: The
Need to Clarify Policy
Jonathan Moreno
University of Pennsylvania, morenojd@mail.med.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers
© Cambridge University Press 2003.
Reprinted from Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, April 2003, pages 192-195.
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0963180103122104
NOTE: At the time of publication, the author was affiliated with the University of Virginia. Currently May 2007, he is a faculty member in the
Department of Bioethics at the School of Medicine of the University of Pennsylvania.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/56
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moreno, J. (2003). Human Experiments and National Security: The Need to Clarify Policy. Retrieved from
http://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/56
Human Experiments and National Security: The Need to Clarify Policy
Abstract
On September 4, 2001, press reports indicated that the Defense Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Department
of Defense (DOD) planned to reproduce a strain of anthrax virus suspected of being held in Russian
laboratories. According to the same reports, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under the auspices of
Project Clear Vision, is engaged in building replicas of bomblets believed to have been developed by the
former Soviet Union. These small bombs were designed to disperse biological agents, including anthrax.
Government attorneys were said to be confident that, because these projects were designed to develop
defensive measures, they were not in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Comments
© Cambridge University Press 2003.
Reprinted from Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, April 2003, pages 192-195.
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0963180103122104
NOTE: At the time of publication, the author was affiliated with the University of Virginia. Currently May
2007, he is a faculty member in the Department of Bioethics at the School of Medicine of the University of
Pennsylvania.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/56
Bioethics and Defense
Human Experiments and National Security:
The Need to Clarify Policy
JONATHAN D. MORENO
The New Environment
of Biodefense Research
On September 4, 2001, press reports
indicated that the Defense Intelligence
Agency of the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) planned to reproduce
a strain of anthrax virus suspected of
being held in Russian laboratories.
According to the same reports, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
under the auspices of Project Clear
Vision, is engaged in building replicas
of bomblets believed to have been
developed by the former Soviet Union.
These small bombs were designed to
disperse biological agents, including
anthrax. Government attorneys were
said to be confident that, because these
projects were designed to develop
defensive measures, they were not in
violation of the 1972 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention.1
Whatever eyebrows might have been
raised by these news stories quickly
dropped within a week of their publi-
cation, when the September 11 catas-
trophes and the subsequent anthrax
attacks suddenly placed bioterrorism
defense at the top of the national
agenda. Other developments occa-
sioned by the new “War on Terror”
have elicited little reaction in the legal,
medical, and health policy communi-
ties, even though they portend the rep-
etition of historic violations of the
public trust. In combination and absent
certain policy reforms, these develop-
ments could lead to human experi-
ments for national security purposes
that are conducted without widely
acknowledged protections. We are in
danger of retracing depressingly famil-
iar territory and thereby reawakening
a legacy of mistrust that burdens the
attitudes of many Americans toward
their government.
Several other developments lead to
the conclusion that events are moving
in an ominous direction, though sep-
arately none may excite great concern
under the current circumstances. On
December 23, 2001, the Bush adminis-
tration granted the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (DHHS) the authority to classify
information as secret. The announce-
ment associated this authority with
the role of DHHS in the domestic secu-
rity effort. No DHHS secretary has
been granted this authority before, yet
there has been virtually no analysis of
the significance of this policy shift.
For example, once such authority is
granted, a process must be put in place
for the assignment of security clear-
ances within that agency, and a chain
of custody, storage, and access to sen-
sitive documents must be put in place,
as well as the establishment of criteria
for classification.
Other current policy initiatives also
relate to secrecy in science. Besides
the withdrawal of various documents
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from public access, the Bush adminis-
tration is drafting a new information
security policy. This policy is expected
to restrict the communication of cer-
tain scientific results. Whatever the ulti-
mate nature of the policy, research
institutions will likely be obliged to
accept expanded restrictions on their
management of information acquired
or retained by their faculty.2
All this is not to imply that the new
classification authority and federal scru-
tiny over research activities is unjusti-
fied. The nature and location of vaccine
stockpiles has long been a matter of
national security, and is so now more
than ever. Similarly, we should cel-
ebrate recent reports that efforts to
vastly increase the supply of smallpox
vaccine through dilution have appar-
ently succeeded, with a “take” having
been achieved among the normal,
healthy volunteers in the study.3 There
is no inconsistency in acknowledging
that the ultimate effect of this effort
may be to boost public morale rather
than protect against a smallpox attack.
It is commonly understood among epi-
demiologists that a mass vaccination
of 300 million Americans would result
in hundreds, if not thousands, of deaths
from the vaccine due to immune sys-
tem disorders in the general popula-
tion. The federal Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) have effectively decided
that mass vaccination for smallpox is
not part of their disaster plan.4
New Arguments for
Secret Research
But in the context of the new inter-
national crisis, the smallpox vaccine
dilution trial is an undertaking worth
noting. It requires little imagination to
foresee an intelligence finding that a
certain hostile power or terrorist group
has acquired an agent that defeats cur-
rent vaccines and is resistant to anti-
biotics. One concern is that a modified
microbe, perhaps a variant anthrax
strain I have mentioned as of concern
to U.S. defense officials, may be made
available by disaffected Russian scien-
tists who still have access to bacterial
or viral stores. There are other grim
possibilities. The former Soviet biolog-
ical weapons officer Ken Alibek has
suggested that Russian scientists may
have continued a program to insert
DNA from Venezuelan equine enceph-
alitis into the genetic structure of the
smallpox virus, thus triggering two
diseases simultaneously.5
How could defensive preparations
proceed under such a scenario? Tra-
ditional approaches, which include
inferences drawn from systematically
acquired primate data or historic expe-
rience with a disease and a therapy,
may be judged inadequate to the secu-
rity threat at hand. For example, I
served as a consultant to the Food and
Drug Administration’s Infective Drugs
Advisory Committee when it met on
July 28, 2000, to consider the Supple-
mental New Drug Application for
Ciprofloxacin as therapy for inhala-
tional anthrax. In this case, there was
an enormous body of data from which
to draw, both in the routine clinical
use of Cipro for lower respiratory tract
infection and in clinical trials. Inhala-
tional anthrax was also considered to
be a well-understood disease, though
its epidemiology is obviously more
informed in light of the 2001 attacks
through the postal system.
Unlike the factors that applied in
this case, including a much-studied
agent and a familiar medication, the
scenario I have sketched would present
authorities with a novel weaponized
pathogen and a speculative potential
therapy. Even if an adequate animal
model were available, officials may be
reluctant to accept the implications of
relying only on primate data for the
protection of military personnel and
first responders. Clinical trials of a
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potential therapy, perhaps including
the exposure of human subjects to the
suspected agent, may turn out to be
very desirable. Secrecy would evi-
dently be preferred in order to protect
information about either the success
or failure of the trial. The study sub-
jects may be drawn from Special Forces
personnel or from units of medical
technicians. In the event that conscrip-
tion is revived, conscientious objectors
or those who prefer noncombat duties
on grounds of religious principle could
be engaged.
The Burdens of History
The history of the use of military per-
sonnel and others in medical experi-
ments for national security purposes
is complex.6 In general, since the 1930s
there has been both reluctance to treat
those who wear the uniform as “human
guinea pigs” as well as instances in
which they were found to be the most
appropriate subjects. At times there
have been no formal protections; at
other times there have been formal
protections that were inadequately
administered. Today the policies and
practices governing the participation
of military personnel in medical re-
search are in some respects even more
stringent than those in the civilian
world. But the success of these arrange-
ments depends on an atmosphere of
transparency and scrutiny. Under the
cover of secrecy, policies and practices
can be rapidly altered under the as-
sumption that they are and will always
be immune to inspection. In some
instances, that assumption has proven
to be warranted, as documents have
intentionally or unintentionally been
destroyed, making a complete histori-
cal reckoning impossible.
Yet rumors of past exploitation have
a way of surfacing, whether accurate
or not, and succeeding generations
acquire an underlying skepticism that
is corrosive of national institutions.
Thus we recall that sailors were re-
quired to endure painful mustard-gas
chamber tests during World War Two,
tens of thousands of soldiers and air-
men were exposed to atomic bomb
tests in the 1950s and early 1960s, and
thousands more were given LSD in
the mid 1960s. Of these incidents only
the last seems to have been covered
by the Pentagon’s own policy at the
time, and on the Army’s own account
was in violation of that policy. But at
least we know the main outlines of
these incidents and can come to terms
with the truth. Other episodes, such
as the CIA’s MK-ULTRA project that
tested hallucinogens on hapless by-
standers, including hospitalized pa-
tients, or the recruitment of German
medical scientists after World War Two,
some with dubious backgrounds, will
never be fully understood because the
records were sanitized.
It can hardly be surprising that the
spillover effect of these kinds of inci-
dents has extended into the post-cold
war era. The DOD has curtailed its
effort, initiated in 1998, to vaccinate
all active-duty and reserve soldiers for
anthrax. Although the official reason
for the policy change was a shortage
of vaccine and doubts about its effica-
cy,7 there was also great concern in
Congress about the program’s ill effects
on morale, as well as its safety.8 Hun-
dreds of men and women refused to
accept vaccination and were disci-
plined. Many complained of health
problems they associated with the ques-
tionable quality of the vaccine. Many
more accepted vaccination but ex-
pressed their anxiety and resentment
privately and in Internet chat rooms.
They were influenced by the suspi-
cions among some Gulf War veterans
that they were used as human guinea
pigs for the anthrax vaccine and other
agents during Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, sometimes alleged as a factor
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in their subsequent illnesses. The Gulf
War vets, in turn, grew up amid the con-
troversy about Agent Orange, which,
though it was not a human experiment,
also had the flavor of government se-
crecy. This chain of cultural suspicion
is one that should be broken.
An Available Policy
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of
the current situation is that a carefully
developed policy to govern classified
research involving human subjects was
adopted in principle by the Clinton
administration. During 1994–1995 I
served as a staff member of the Advi-
sory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments (ACHRE). In 1997, follow-
ing the ACHRE recommendations,
President Clinton issued an executive
memorandum that instructed all agen-
cies to propose modifications in federal
policies for secret projects, including
IRB review with at least one nongov-
ernmental member, an appeals pro-
cess for any dissenting IRB member,
and permanent record-keeping by the
sponsor. Subjects would have to be
informed of the sponsoring agency,
except in cases of minimal risk, and
that the project involves classified
research. Another presidential direc-
tive released at the time of the response
to the ACHRE report required the
heads of federal agencies to disclose
annually the number of secret human
research projects undertaken by the
agency and the number of human sub-
jects participating in each project.9
These requirements were to be added
to the federal Common Rule on human
subjects research. Although imperfect,
the rules would at least provide a mea-
sure of protection to the subjects and
ensure that posterity does not lose the
opportunity to achieve an accurate
accounting. Yet nearly 6 years after
they were proposed, the standards for
secret research have not been written
into the rules of a single federal agency,
including the DHHS with its new clas-
sification authority.
The low priority accorded this mat-
ter prior to September 11 is no longer
acceptable. In its final report to the
President, his human radiation exper-
iments advisory committee concluded
that, too often, our government failed
to implement the moral values it
espoused.10 If appropriate require-
ments that build on the hard lessons
of the past are not adopted before the
renewal of secret national security
experiments, future generations of
Americans will be justified in con-
cluding that we, too, succumbed to
hypocrisy.
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